The New Evil Demon problem has been hotly debated since the case was introduced in the early 1980’s (e.g. Lehrer and Cohen 1983; Cohen 1984), and there seems to be recent increased interest in the topic. In a forthcoming collection of papers on the New Evil Demon problem (Dutant and Dorsch, forthcoming), at least two of the papers, both by prominent epistemologists, attempt to resist the problem by appealing to the distinction between justification and excuses. My primary aim here is (...) to critically evaluate this new excuse maneuver as a response to the New Evil Demon problem. -/- Their response attempts to give us reason to reject the idea that victims of the New Evil Demon have justification for believing as they do. I shall argue that this approach is ultimately unsuccessful, however much of value can be learned from these attempts. In particular, progress in the debate can be made by following those who advance the excuse maneuver and make explicit the connection between epistemic justification and epistemic norms. By doing so, the questions being debated are clarified, as is the methodology being used to attempt to answer them. (shrink)

In common with traditional forms of epistemic internalism, epistemological disjunctivism attempts to incorporate an awareness condition on justification. Unlike traditional forms of internalism, however, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the so-called New Evil Genius thesis. In so far as epistemological disjunctivism rejects the New Evil Genius thesis, it is revisionary. -/- After explaining what epistemological disjunctivism is, and how it relates to traditional forms of epistemic internalism / externalism, I shall argue that the epistemological disjunctivist’s account of the intuitions underlying the New (...) Evil Genius thought experiment is at best incomplete. As presented, therefore, epistemological disjunctivism is unable to accommodate the core guiding intuitions of epistemic internalism. Given the stated aim of not being revisionary on this score, the view is at a dialectical disadvantage over the traditional forms of epistemic internalism the position is meant to replace. Unfortunately, therefore, at present, the impasse between internalism and externalism remains. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming that true belief does (...) have value, there is more of final epistemic value than mere true belief. (shrink)

One thing nearly all epistemologists agree upon is that Gettier cases are decisive counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge; whatever else is true of knowledge, it is not merely belief that is both justified and true. They now agree that knowledge is not justified true belief because this is consistent with there being too much luck present in the cases, and that knowledge excludes such luck. This is to endorse what has become known as the 'anti-luck platitude'. <br /><br (...) />But what if generations of philosophers have been mistaken about this, blinded at least partially by a deeply entrenched professional bias? There has been another, albeit minority, response to Gettier: to deny that the cases are counterexamples at all. <br /><br />Stephen Hetherington, a principal and vocal proponent of this view, advances what he calls the 'Knowing Luckily Proposal'. If Hetherington is correct, this would call for a major re-evaluation and re-orientation of post-Gettier analytic epistemology, since much of it assumes the anti-luck platitude both in elucidating the concept of knowledge, and in the application of such accounts to central philosophical problems. It is therefore imperative that the Knowing Luckily Proposal be considered and evaluated in detail. <br /><br />In this paper I critically assess the Knowing Luckily Proposal. I argue that while it draws our attention to certain important features of knowledge, ultimately it fails, and the anti-luck platitude emerges unscathed. Whatever else is true of knowledge, therefore, it is non-lucky true belief. For a proposition to count as knowledge, we cannot arrive at its truth accidentally or for the wrong reason. (shrink)

In general, epistemic internalists hold that an individual’s justification for a belief is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons for thinking that the contents of her beliefs are true. Applying this to the epistemology of testimony, a hearer’s justification for beliefs acquired through testimony is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons to think that the contents of the speaker’s testimony is true. A consequence of internalism is that subjects that are alike with respect to their reflectively accessible reasons are alike (...) with respect to what they have justification to believe. Testimony should be thought no different: hearers that are alike with respect to reflectively accessible reasons to think that a speaker’s testimony is true are alike with respect to their justification for beliefs based upon that testimony. But it has been recently argued that this view faces powerful counterexamples. So the central question is this: assuming that a hearer can acquire justification to believe a proposition through the testimony of a speaker, can epistemic internalism provide the resources to explain how such justification is possible? My aim in this paper is to address these counterexamples, and in so doing, defend epistemic internalist accounts of testimony. (shrink)

The thesis that there can be vague objects is the thesis that there can be identity statements which are indeterminate in truth-value (i.e., neither true nor false) as a result of vagueness (as opposed, e.g., to reference-failure), "the singular terms of which do not have their references fixed by vague descriptive means". (if this is "not" what is meant by the thesis that there can be vague objects, it is not clear what "is" meant by it.) the possibility of vague (...) objects should not be taken, in itself, to imply the more radical thesis that the identity relation can be one of "degree". one can hold that the concept of degrees of identity is absurd (how can one thing be more or less identical to another?) "and" that indeterminacy in identity is possible; hence, any incoherence in the idea of degrees of identity does not thereby undermine the idea of indeterminate identity. (shrink)

Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can be correct, (...) as it has been alleged that internalism cannot account for the possibility of the justification of beliefs stored in memory. -/- My aim in this paper is to offer a response that explains how memory justification is possible in a way that is consistent with epistemic internalism and an awareness condition on justification. Specifically, I will explore the plausibility of various options open to internalists, including both foundationalist and non-foundationalist approaches to the structure of justification. I intend to show that despite other difficult challenges that epistemic internalism might face, memory belief poses no special problems that the resources of internalism cannot adequately address. (shrink)

Influential cases have been provided that seem to suggest that one can fail to have knowledge because of the social environment. If not a distinct kind of social defeater, is there a uniquely social phenomenon that defeats knowledge? My aim in this paper is to explore these questions. I shall argue that despite initial appearances to the contrary, we have no reason to accept a special class of social defeater, nor any essentially social defeat phenomenon. We can explain putative cases (...) of social defeat with our existing epistemological apparatus. (shrink)

In this paper I consider a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s that epistemic internalism and content externalism are indeed incompatible, and since he takes content externalism to be above reproach, so much the worse for epistemic internalism. However, I argue that epistemic internalism, properly understood, remains substantially unaffected no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key to the New Evil Genius thought experiment is that, given everything of which the inhabitants are consciously aware, the (...) two worlds are subjectively indistinguishable for them, which is what matters on internalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that even if a standard moral of the New Evil Genius intuition is untenable due to considerations arising from content externalism, the case can be understood as supporting epistemic internalism in a way that is wholly compatible with content externalism. In short, epistemic internalism is committed to sameness of justificatory status between subjectively indistinguishable counterparts, not sameness of content of their justifiers. (shrink)

Analysis of 'the common good' reveals moral elements in the concept. The common good, Traditionally regarded as a major political goal, Is served by measures that promote the interests of all citizens equitably, Within the limitations of 'the accepted morality'. Measures for the common good thus often impose moral restraints on individuals' interests, As numerous examples show. Positivist analyses are generally defective because they do not give the normative elements their proper place.

In this paper, we re-examine a series of gedanken welcher Weg (WW) experiments introduced by Scully, Englert and Walther that contain the essential ideas underlying the quantum eraser. For this purpose we use the Bohm model which gives a sharp picture of the behaviour of the atoms involved in these experiments. This model supports the thesis that interference disappears in such WW experiments, even though the centre of mass wave function remains coherent throughout the experiment. It also shows exactly what (...) it means to say ‘that the interference can be restored by manipulating the WW detectors long after the atoms have passed’. It does not support Wheeler’s notion that ‘the past is undefined and undefinable without the observation (in the present)’. (shrink)

In this paper we show how the dynamics of the Schrödinger, Pauli and Dirac particles can be described in a hierarchy of Clifford algebras, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}${\mathcal{C}}_{1,3}, {\mathcal{C}}_{3,0}$\end{document}, and \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}${\mathcal{C}}_{0,1}$\end{document}. Information normally carried by the wave function is encoded in elements of a minimal left ideal, so that all the physical information appears within the algebra itself. The state of the quantum process can be (...) completely characterised by algebraic invariants of the first and second kind. The latter enables us to show that the Bohm energy and momentum emerge from the energy-momentum tensor of standard quantum field theory. Our approach provides a new mathematical setting for quantum mechanics that enables us to obtain a complete relativistic version of the Bohm model for the Dirac particle, deriving expressions for the Bohm energy-momentum, the quantum potential and the relativistic time evolution of its spin for the first time. (shrink)

Business theory and management practices are outgrowths of basic economic principles. To evaluate the proper place of ethics in business, the meaning of ethics as defined by economic theory must be assessed. This paper contends that classical economic thought advocates a nonethical decision-making context and is not functional for a modern complex, interdependent environment.

In this paper I want to examine quantum teleportation from a point of view that is different from that normally considered. This will enable us to gain a new perspective into what is involved in the process of teleportation. It is clear that, at least in the case where particles are involved, it is not the particle that is transported, but rather the information contained in the wave function. This idea in itself is not new, but the central question that (...) requires clarification is the nature of this information. This paper provides a new insight into this question. (shrink)

In its most basic form, Simple Reliabilism states that: a belief is justified iff it is formed as the result of a reliable belief-forming process. But so-called New Evil Demon cases have been given as counterexamples. A common response has been to complicate reliabilism from its simplest form to accommodate the basic reliabilist position, while at the same time granting the force of NED intuitions. But what if despite initial appearances, Simple Reliabilism, without qualification, is compatible with the NED intuition? (...) What we can call the Dispositionalist Response to the New Evil Demon problem is fascinating because it contends just that: Simple Reliabilism is fully compatible with the NED intuition. It is claimed that all we need to do to recognize their compatibility is appreciate that reliability is a dispositional property. In this paper I shall critically evaluate the Dispositionalist proposal. (shrink)

If knowledge requires safety, then one might think that when the epistemic source of knowledge is testimony, that testimony must itself be safe. Otherwise, will not the lack of safety transfer from testimony to hearer, such that hearer will lack knowledge? Resisting this natural line of reasoning, Goldberg (2005; 2007) argues that testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible on the basis of two cases. Lackey (2008) and Pelling (2013) criticize Goldberg’s examples. But Pelling goes on to provide his own (...) example that attempts to show that Goldberg’s thesis is true: one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony. If any of these counterexamples were correct, they would undermine the main reason to think that knowledge based on unsafe testimony is impossible. My aim in this paper is to critically assess these arguments, and to consider the possibility of knowledge through unsafe testimony. Drawing a general moral from the analysis of these cases, I shall contend that it is impossible to acquire safe belief solely on the basis of unsafe testimony. If so, then testimonial knowledge based solely on unsafe testimony is impossible. (shrink)

In addition to the notion of defeat, do we need to expand the epistemological repertoire used in accounting for the context dependence of justification? It has recently been argued that we ought to admit a hitherto unrecognized fundamental epistemic kind called ‘disqualifiers’. Disqualifiers are taken to be not reducible to any other epistemic notion. Rather, they are meant to be primitive. If this is correct, it is a surprising and novel discovery, and so it is worthy of further epistemological investigation. (...) In this paper I shall first argue that the cases given do not motivate positing the notion of a disqualifier. Conclusions drawn about the existence of disqualifiers do not follow from the considerations advanced. Second, I shall directly argue that an essential core claim of those who would posit disqualifiers, that so-called disqualifiers actually do prevent epistemic bases from conferring justification, is false. In sum, I shall argue that there are no disqualifiers. (shrink)

This note criticizes Andrew Brennan's attempt to defend best?candidate theories of the identity of artefacts over time against certain now familiar objections. Adoption of a mereological conception of individuals does not, in itself, provide the means for a satisfactory response to objections of Wiggins and Noonan (some of which are anyway ill?focused). The way forward consists in recognizing that the consequences of best?candidate theories which have been thought objectionable (in particular, commitment to the extrinsicness of identity) do not violate the (...) necessity of identity and imply ? what anyway ought to seem unexceptionable ? that a predicate such as ?constituting the ship which is the Ship of Theseus? does not denote a genuine property of the hunk of matter of which the predicate is true. Once these consequences have been clearly mapped out, the best?candidate theorist's commitment to the extrinsicness of identity does not appear absurd. (shrink)

Vice epistemology, as Quassim Cassam understands it, is the study of the nature, identity, and significance of the epistemic vices. But what makes an intellectual vice a vice? Cassam calls his own view “Obstructivism” – intellectual vices are those traits, thinking styles, or attitudes that systematically obstruct the acquisition, retention, and transmission of knowledge. -/- I shall argue that Cassam’s account is an improvement upon virtue-reliabilism, and that it fares better against what I call Montmarquet’s objection than its immediate rivals. (...) Nevertheless, I contend that it does not go far enough — Montmarquet’s objection stands. -/- I conclude that either the objection needs to be answered in some other way, or else proponents of Obstructivism need to explain why their account of the nature of the intellectual vices does not have the counterintuitive consequences it appears to have. Alternatively, another account of the nature of the intellectual vices needs to be sought. (shrink)

Multifactorial analyses of data from representative British and German national contraception surveys were used to examine the principal demographic determinants of contraceptive use by women. Contraceptive use appeared to be determined mainly by reference to ‘reproductive status’. Women who were postponing pregnancies were using oral contraceptives, whereas those who wanted no more children relied more on intrauterine devices or sterilisation. Differences between the countries suggested that the choice of contraceptive method was influenced by health care policy, the organisation of the (...) relevant services and differential provider preferences. The contraceptive method used was also related to having occasional rather than steady sexual partners, lower educational level and frequent church attendance. Contraception decisions appeared to follow a fixed pattern, based more on a couple's demographic situation than on the characteristics of the contraceptive methods. This resulted in an unnecessarily restricted choice of methods. (shrink)

Measurement of gravitomagnetic field is of fundamental importance as a test of general relativity. Here we present a new theoretical project for performing such a measurement based on detection of the electric field arising from the interplay between the gravitomagnetic and magnetic fields in the stationary axial-symmetric gravitational field of a slowly rotating massive body. Finally it is shown that precise magnetometers based on superconducting quantum interferometers could not be designed for measurement of the gravitomagnetically induced magnetic field in the (...) cavity of a charged capacitor since they measure the circulation of a vector potential of electromagnetic field, i.e., an invariant quantity including the sum of electric and magnetic fields, and the general-relativistic magnetic part will be totally cancelled by the electric one which is in good agreement with the experimental results. (shrink)

[opening paragraph]: Ramachandran and Hirstein claim that ‘peak shift', or exaggeration of salient features, ‘explains not only caricatures but all art.’ I would like to test the peak shift hypothesis in a case that at first glance seems to support it. Edmond Rostand's play Cyrano de Bergerac is the tragicomic tale of a grand poetic wit of Paris in the 17th. century, a noble fighter and master of fencing who loves with all his heart, but feels he is unlovable for (...) one very prominent reason: his wondrously prognathous nose. When a challenger pokes fun at Cyrano's most notable facial feature, the latter contemptuously provides a lesson in satiric exaggeration. (shrink)

Research in higher education could be more useful, innovative and better designed if we were clearer about the philosophical and epistemological basis of the theories that underlie our research methods. People who have to interpret research would do a better job if they were able to interrogate research more critically and appreciate its strengths and weaknesses. This volume provides this information for an audience of researchers, policymakers, students and lecturers in higher education. The authors seek to create a dialogue with (...) the reader about issues relevant to the philosophy of research and stimulate interest in how philosophy plays out in the real, everyday, political world, not least in education. Unlike many existing volumes on the market, this book creates a space in which readers can use the tools for thinking that the authors describe to interrogate their own experience. (shrink)

The path to consensus about physicians’ exercise of conscience was not linear. It looped back on itself as new insights illuminated earlier deliberations and in turn led to further insights. In particular, coming to agreement about physicians’ responsibility in regard to referral charted a route through many course corrections.

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;In this thesis I argue that we ought to accept some version of the Analysis view--the view that the identity of a person over time can be analysed in terms of physical and/or psychological continuities. I also argue that there is no sense in which we ought to be ontological reductionists about persons--a person is an essentially embodied, irreducible, entity whose identity over time is analysable in terms of (...) physical and psychological continuities. ;I argue that any plausible theory of personal identity over time is a best-candidate theory, which implies that the identity of a person over time can be extrinsically determined. Some philosophers find this consequence absurd; but I claim that they have no good reason to. I also show how reference to the extrinsicness of identity features in a powerful argument for Derek Parfit's thesis that identity is not "what matters". Finally, I argue that there are plausible counter-examples to all versions of the Physical and Psychological Criteria of personal identity, and that we ought to accept a version of the Mixed Criterion which acknowledges the importance of both sorts of continuity, but which assigns greater weight to the relation of psychological continuity. (shrink)

n this note I wish to reopen discussion of the role of Cornelius Nepos in Catullus' dedicatory poem. The Callimachean features of Catullus' assessment of his own work have been well documented. However I believe that, since this is a poem where Catullus evaluates not only his own work, but also that of Nepos, a closer examination of the latter is called for.

In the poem which sets the seal on his three books of odes, Horace declares that his monument to himself will be more durable than bronze and higher than the pyramids. As T. E. Page noted in his commentary, aere can suggest not only bronze tablets, but also commemorative statuary, although tablets seems more to the fore here, given the reference to monumentum As for the pyramids, they are a fine example of grandiloquent architecture, but of a kind which is (...) nevertheless subject to the destructive natural forces from which Horace exempts his own commemoration. (shrink)

Statius′ Silvae 5.4 is one of the best-known poems in the collection, although it is also one of the least representative. Its nineteen lines make it the shortest poem in the Silvae, and although there are other brief poems, such as those describing the parrot of Melior and the tame lion , it is quite different from the many longer poems that deal with subjects and persons from contemporary society. Of course insomnia must always be a universal issue, but this (...) is nevertheless a poem that does not draw the reader into the ‘ life and times’ of Statius as do the poems which precede and follow it, the laments for his father and for a child. (shrink)

One of the central puzzles for Baars is the contrast between the small window of consciousness of which we all have direct experience and the massive collection of specialized neural nets, all working in parallel in the depths of our brain. Why is this window so small? Can we use the metaphor of a theatre, in which we regard consciousness as merely acting like a spotlight moving over an already existing structure of thoughts, memories and experiences, or does it involve (...) something more active with thoughts being created anew from moment to moment? (shrink)

What does it take for a positive epistemic status to obtain? I argue throughout my thesis that if a positive epistemic status obtains, this is not a brute fact. Instead, if for example a belief is justified, it is justified in virtue of some further condition(s) obtaining. A fundamental topic in epistemology is the question of what sorts of factors can be relevant to determining the positive epistemic status of belief. Epistemic Internalism holds that these factors must be “internal” (in (...) a sense that needs to be specified). Epistemic Externalism is the denial of internalism. My thesis is an explanation and defense of an internalist theory of epistemic justification. -/- The central claim of my thesis is that something is “internal” in this sense only if it is, or can easily be, the object of the agent’s conscious awareness. By considering key cases, I show that without an awareness requirement on justification, the subject cannot avoid what I call the Subject’s Perspective Objection. In developing this objection I examine and respond to an argument against the awareness requirement which claims that such awareness either leads to a vicious regress of requiring higher order beliefs of increasing complexity (if any beliefs are to be justified), or else requiring such awareness is unmotivated. This regress is generated because it is assumed that the relevant kind of awareness must be doxastic. My solution invokes what I call ‘strong non-doxastic awareness’ that grounds non-inferential justification and thereby avoids this dilemma, while meeting the Subject’s Perspective Objection. -/- I also argue that external factors, such as the reliability (actual or conditional) of the mechanism supporting the belief, are not necessary for justification. I argue for this conclusion by comparing what constitutes justified belief in the actual world with one’s counterpart in a ‘demon world’. I argue that this intuition, correctly interpreted, counts in favour of internalism. As I explain, many philosophers moved by arguments presented by externalists about mental content deny that such a case is possible. In opposition I argue that the awareness requirement remains substantially unaffected, no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key is that the two worlds are completely subjectively indistinguishable from each other for those who inhabit them in all the ways of which they are consciously aware. -/- If neither the obtaining of truth nor reliability is necessary for epistemic justification, what makes justification genuinely epistemic? In the final chapter I argue against recent work that assimilates justification with knowledge, as well as for a positive account of the truth connection. As to the former question, I defend the orthodoxy that they are distinct epistemic statuses; as to the latter, I argue that the connection between justification and truth is conceptual. That is, epistemic justification is epistemic because it turns on evidence; evidence is epistemic because it is conceptually linked with truth. Epistemic justification, therefore, is conceptually linked with the truth (via evidence), which is what makes it distinctively epistemic. -/- In short, this thesis is an explanation and defense of an internalist theory of epistemic justification. The central claim of the thesis is that something is “internal” in this sense only if it is, or can easily be, the object of the agent’s conscious awareness. I argue that conscious awareness is a necessary condition of epistemic justification obtaining, and that factors external to consciousness play no justificatory role. (shrink)

My thesis is on the intersection of epistemology and the philosophy of religion. Contemporary religious epistemology asks the question of how, if at all, can religious belief be rationally justified. I focus on a relatively new tradition that responds to this question known as Reformed Epistemology, as advanced by Alvin Plantinga. Reformed Epistemologists argue that belief in God can be rational, reasonable, and justified without appeal to evidence as was traditionally thought. Plantinga argues that religious belief stems from an innate (...) faculty which produces properly basic beliefs that need not rest on any other beliefs for their justification. My aim is to critically examine these claims. My thesis begins in section I with a discussion of Plantinga’s early attacks on classical foundationalism and Evidentialism, that is, the view that being rational means according one's belief with the evidence. His early goal is to discredit the Evidentialist objection by rebutting the flawed epistemological system he argues it presupposes. In so doing, Plantinga attempts to loosen the canons of basicality to include the belief in God as properly basic. -/- In section II I then discuss Plantinga’s notion of warrant, which is his term for justification – the hallmark difference between true belief and knowledge. After examining the tenability of Plantinga’s concept of what makes belief warranted, I examine how successfully he specifically applies this notion of justification to religious belief. Plantinga’s contention is that religious belief can enjoy enough warrant so that if the belief is true, it will constitute knowledge. In examining this claim I evaluate in section III Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism, his Aquinas/Calvin model in section IV, potential rationality defeaters in section V and in section VI the larger question of the internalism / externalism debate and its influence on these central issues. (shrink)

The ELSI Program: Closing the Loop was an interpretive policy study undertaken to identify how the research and the researchers funded through the program to study the ethical, legal, and social implications of mapping the human genome contributed to the construction of a public policy agenda. The stated goals of this federal grant program, known as ELSI and administered through the National Center for Human Genome Research within the National Institutes of Health, was to maximize the benefits and minimize the (...) harms of the genetic information developed as a result of the government supported genomic research. The purpose of the research project was to generate meaning and understanding regarding the social constructions of this community of researchers. Specifically, identifying themes in the process and outcomes of the research activity was intended to inform future public policy actions, thereby, closing the loop on the reflexive activity generated by the ELSI Program. The activities of the sixty-four researchers granted awards between 1990 and 1993 comprised the core sample for the study. The research process was embedded in a constructivist philosophy and the design included participant observation and an analysis of textual materials generated by the grantees. Data included periodical articles, authored and edited books, videos, popular print and visual media materials, conference papers and presentations, forum reports, interviews, and materials generated by the researcher in the process of the research--notes and analytic memos. Data analysis was an interpretive synthesis of a content analysis, contextual analysis, grounded theory coding categories, and the reflexive process of the researcher. ;The phenomena under investigation were the interactional activities of the ELSI group of researchers through which meaning was shaped on the ethical, legal, and social implications of genomic mapping. A theoretical model of the constructions of the researchers as developed included two core categories: "Framing Academic Constructions" and "Institutionalizing the Myth". The ELSI researchers used a variety of strategies, including rhetorical questioning, professional blocking and impersonalizing, plying a trade, and academic time in generating constructions. The research and researchers contributed to institutionalizing a myth of a genome through strategies that included being the expert, narrowing the focus, and marveling. The consequence of these social interactions was a process of "Making Points Not Meaning", participation in symbolic activities that generated few issues for the public policy agenda. The constructions of the policy study were then situated in the context of the discipline of public administration and policy studies. Significant to the impact of the research findings was understanding how the cooptation of these researchers might effect an health care delivery system dominated by commercial interests such as biotechnology and managed care organizations. The study concluded with a discussion of how situated knowledge constructions, social epistemology, interdisciplinarity, and interpretive research methods might contribute to enhanced credibility in public policy actions. (shrink)

Psychological determinants of contraceptive use were investigated in Great Britain and Germany, using national data obtained in 1992. It was hypothesised that current contraceptive use among sexually active, fertile women aged 15-45 was related to their attitude towards the various contraceptive methods, social influences, perceptions of being able to use a method correctly and consistently, a correct estimation of fertility, and communication with their partner. Effects of age and country were also taken into account.The attitude of respondents towards the various (...) contraceptive methods was ambivalent and no method was seen as ideal. On medical methods many respondents expressed doubts as to their safety for health. Social influences most frequently concerned the use of OCs. Respondents considered themselves able to use oral contraceptives correctly, but expressed general fear about intrauterine devices and sterilisation, and many women believed they were not able to use condoms and periodic abstinence consistently.Multifactorial analyses revealed that current contraceptive use was principally determined by social influences, attitude and self-efficacy with respect to medical methods. Age and country, and, for use of unreliable methods, fertility awareness also played a role. Communication with the partner was less relevant.Contraceptive choice depended greatly on encouragement to use and being in favour of medical methods. A lack of social support for use of medical methods and a negative attitude towards them was related to higher use rates of condoms, periodic abstinence, withdrawal and reliance on ‘luck’. In the case of withdrawal and/or no method, underestimation of fertility played an additional role.Contraceptive choice appears to be determined more by a general like or dislike of medical methods rather than on a weighing of the merits of individual available methods. (shrink)

The revival of the optative by authors of the Second Sophistic is the most striking example of their endeavour to return to Attic usage. Criticisms of it are generally of two kinds: first, that the optative was not current in the spoken language of the period, and secondly, that having reintroduced the optative they used it incorrectly. The first of these faults, if it is a fault, only carries farther the normal tendency of artistic writers to archaism; for all literature (...) goes to some extent by precedent, and it is natural for its admirers to regard changes in the language with suspicion. Lucian has received a full share of harsh words for his use of the optative, and it is true that by Attic standards there are mistakes. It is, however, hazardous to generalize too freely about the language of so versatile a writer, especially in view of his penchant for parody, and it will be more convenient to consider one particular construction. (shrink)

SummaryThe writings of the very popular American poet Robert Frost (1874–1963) reveal an unusually specific and detailed knowledge of science. This was particularly evident among the poems of his penultimate volume, Steeple Bush, of 1947. Several of these poems confronted with basic insights issues raised by the period's ‘new physics’. Among those, especially Frost's epigram ‘A Wish to Comply’ wittily confronted an important epistemological difficulty in particle physics. Such science must induce a belief in the fundamental importance of entities invisible (...) to any physical human senses except those aided by complex apparatus used in abstruse experiments. Recondite scientific issues are confronted in other poems published in Steeple Bush such as ‘Skeptic’ (which meditates on the ‘red shift’ evidence for an expanding universe), but these poems are clearly derived from popular theoretical expositions, not practical experience. ‘A Wish to Comply’, on the other hand, clearly records an actual experience of a failed Millikan ‘oil drop’ experiment. This event evidently led to the poet to fake a report of his own observation of an electrically charged oil droplet, for reasons of social pressure. In meditating on these circumstances the epigram opens questions relating to scientific ‘systematic error’, the suppression, ‘trimming’ or ‘cooking’ of experimental data, and a bias toward confirmation of highly respected opinions. Although Frost did not live to know it, two of these questions have been latterly opened in regard to Millikan's own reports of his original oil drop experimental data. (shrink)

Dreyfus examines the central ideas of Dharmakīrti, one of the most important Indian Buddhist philosophers, and their reception among Tibetan thinkers. During the golden age of ancient Indian civilization, Dharmakīrti articulated and defended Buddhist philosophical principles. He did so more systematically than anyone before his time (the seventh century CE) and was followed by a rich tradition of profound thinkers in India and Tibet. This work presents a detailed picture of this Buddhist tradition and its relevance to the history of (...) human ideas. Its perspective is mostly philosophical, but it also uses historical considerations as they relate to the evolution of ideas. (shrink)

A continuous spatial automaton is analogous to a cellular automaton, except that the cells form a continuum, as do the possible states of the cells. After an informal mathematical description of spatial automata, we describe in detail a continuous analog of Conway’s “Life,” and show how the automaton can be implemented using the basic operations of field computation.

In a series of illuminating papers Frankena called attention to a basic philosophical disagreement about what features distinguish moral from non-moral principles, rules, ideals, etc., and about “what a morality is,” when, for example, one speaks of the “morality” of a person or a group. After reviewing a number of writings, he emphasized an important contrast between two “families” of moralists and moral philosophers. On the one side are those who think that certain “formal” conditions are sufficient to distinguish moral (...) “action-guides” from nonmoral ones. On the other side are those who insist that a certain “material” and “social” condition must be added; as they see it, an action-guide is moral only if it pronounces “actions and agents to be right, wrong, good, bad, etc., simply because of the effect they have on the feelings, interests, ideals, etc., of other persons or centers of sentient experience, actual or hypothetical.” The issue, in brief, is whether any set of principles or other articles counts as a morality simply because a person or a group of persons takes that set as the supreme, or as a rational and universalizable guide to what is right and wrong, or whether such a set must be “social” in the sense that acts are prescribed as right or wrong in virtue of the acts’ effects on others as well as on oneself. In the former group, Frankena includes existentialists, many religious thinkers, Hare, Ladd, Falk, etc.; in the latter, Toulmin, Baier, Singer, Strawson, Kemp, etc. (shrink)

A new ecumenical confession of faithRecently theologians, church leaders and even churches from all over the world expressed the desirability of a new confession of faith, preferably an ecumenical confession. The Reformed Church in America proposed a new confession with their Song of Hope. They still maintain large parts of their 16th century reformed confessions but the following motives played a role in their desire for a new confession:• The necessity to correct the existing, 'old' confessions in the light of (...) modem scientific Bible-research, e g on the doctrine of predestination.• The need for additional confession-pronouncements on modern-day issues and experiences, unknown to the church in the 16th century.• The desirability of a new form to communicate with modem man.• The sensitivity of the churches of today towards church-unity and the trends living in the oikouménè, e g their social awareness.We then proceed to treat the motives why a reformed Church überhaupt needs and forms a confession. In the light of these motives the question arises whether our Church really needs a new confession today; is the exposition of the existing confessions in theology, catechesis, preaching and modem church-hymns not enough to translate and communicate the existing confessions to modem man and to address modern-day issues? (shrink)

From a global historical viewpoint, federal systems are the exception rather than the rule, even though examples of federalism can already be found in Greek antiquity. From the 17th century onwards there was a revival of federalism, but in the post-World War II-era of decolonization federal systems did not emerge as the most popular form of government.Still, there is considerable variation among federal systems, i.e. those political systems where governmental authority is constitutionally divided among a central «federal» government and «state» (...) governments in such a way, that each type of government has final decision-making authority in at least a few policy fields ; a federation may be either effective or formal, unitary or decentralized, symmetrical or asymmetrical. In order to explain the extent and the kind of federalism in specific cases, the formallegal structure, the socio-economic environment and the political behaviour of elites as well as citizens should be taken into account. Political behaviour should be taken as the key factor, without disregard, however, for its relationship to social factors and format structures. In order to assess their relative importance, comparative research is required; Western Europe and the Third World offer highly promising prospects for this type of research. On the research agenda of federalism, special attention should be given to topics like the informal federal arrangements in cabinet formation, policy-making and public administration, federal party polities, and the impact of public policies on the federal socio-economic environment. (shrink)

We bring out the fact that the essential new quality implied by the quantum theory is nonlocality; i.e., that a system cannot be analyzed into parts whose basic properties do not depend on the state of the whole system. This is done in terms of the causal interpretation of the quantum theory, proposed by one of us (D.B.) in 2952, involving the introduction of the “quantum potential.” We show that this approach implies a new universal type of description, in which (...) the standard or canonical form is always supersystem-system-subsystem; and this leads to the radically new notion of unbroken wholeness of the entire universe. Finally, we discuss some of the implications of extending these notions to the relativity domain, and in so doing, we indicate a novel concept of time, in terms of which relativity and quantum theory may eventually be brought together. (shrink)

An enthusiastic and not completely implausible attempt to interpret Aristotle as a "thoroughgoing behaviorist. He is, of course, a functional and contextual behaviorist, not a mechanistic behaviorist. For him, life is the power of living and knowing, the power of selective response to the world." Randall sees in Aristotle a disturbing and philosophically inexplicable tendency to "platonize" in the Organon, the De Caelo, Bk. X of the Ethics, and so on. The physical treatises, the Politics and Ethics, the Poetics and (...) Rhetoric, however, expose the "Aristotelian" side of Aristotle, since they deal with the powers of selective response and the variety of natural processes, as well as offering a method for achieving practical aims.--J. B. (shrink)

Conscious events interact with memory systems in learning, rehearsal and retrieval (Ebbinghaus 1885/1964; Tulving 1985). Here we present hypotheses that arise from the IDA computional model (Franklin,Kelemen and McCauley 1998; Franklin 2001b) of global workspace theory (Baars 1988, 2002). Our primary tool for this exploration is a flexible cognitive cycle employed by the IDA computational model and hypothesized to be a basic element of human cognitive processing. Since cognitive cycles are hypothesized to occur five to tentimes a second and include (...) interaction between conscious contents and several of the memory systems, they provide the means for an exceptionally fine-grained analysis of various cognitive tasks. We apply this tool to the small effect size of subliminal learning compared to supraliminal learning, to process dissociation, to implicit learning, to recognition vs. recall, and to the availability heuristic in recall. The IDA model elucidates the role of consciousness in the updating of perceptual memory, transient episodic memory, and procedural memory. In most cases, memory is hypothesized to interact with conscious events for its normal functioning. The methodology of the paper is unusual in that the hypotheses and explanations presented are derived from an empirically based, but broad and qualitative computational model of human cognition. (shrink)

There is great skepticism about the admittance of expert normative ethics testimony into evidence. However, a practical analysis of the way ethics testimony has been used in courts of law reveals that the skeptical position is itself based on assumptions that are controversial. We argue for an alternative way to understand such expert testimony. This alternative understanding is based on the practice of clinical ethics.

In addition to essays which have appeared before, this collection includes two new works, "Synthetic a Priori" and "Realistic Postscript." Clearing away the last remnants of his former phenomenalism, Bergmann explicitly proclaims a realistic ontology. Characters are things just as truly as individuals are. Non-obtaining facts exist in a mode of possibility. Bergmann extends his analysis of the act, which he acknowledges to be central to his philosophy, to acts with physical or non-mental intentions. In the light of his own (...) views, he examines the ontologies of Frege, Husserl, Moore, Wittgenstein and Strawson. The confrontation with Husserl, who moved in the opposite direction, from realism to idealism, is particularly interesting.—J. B. B. (shrink)

Articles by Castelli, Dempf, de Corte, del Noce, Garin, Gigon, Gouhier, Guéroult, Husserl, Lombardi, Valori, and Wagner on a variety of topics pertinent to the philosophy of history, such as myth and history, legitimacy of the philosophy of history, and historic intention. Of special interest is a commentary and French translation by M. Valori of two unpublished manuscripts of Husserl. In these manuscripts one can see how Husserl views the place of phenomenological study in the history of philosophy since Descartes.--J. (...) E. B. (shrink)

Emphasizing Hume's claim of a gulf between the rational bases of religion and its empirical, historical origins, the Introduction holds that the History marks the beginning of the philosophy of religion. --J. E. B.